"The notion that Israel’s Wars were Wars of self-defense and that its limited military actions were primarily “retaliatory” in nature rests on shaky foundations. Many Israeli politicians and institutional historians have tried to sell the world and the Israeli public for decades the conception that Israel’s military actions were primarily actions of self-defense. Some Israeli strategists have supported this notion by arguing that Israeli strategic posture was politically defensive (i.e., status quo oriented) but militarily offensive (e.g., Yaniv 1987a, 1995; Tal 2000; Levite 1989). The second part of this observation is generally true; the first part is not.
"The central conclusion of the first part of this book is that most of Israel’s Wars were the result of deliberate aggressive designs or flawed conflict management strategies. At least one War (the Yom Kippur War) could have been avoided by judicious diplomacy. Israel’s War Experience is a story of folly, recklessness, and self-made traps. None of the Wars – with the possible exception of the 1948 War of Independence – was what Israelis call Milhemet Ein Brerah (“War of necessity”). They were all Wars of choice or Wars of folly."
------------------------
“Second, there is a huge gap between the hostility to Israel in Arab Rhetoric and the actual efforts invested in fighting it. In fact, for a long time there may well have been an inverse correlation between Rhetoric and effort in the Arab-Israeli conflict: those States and groups that made the most noise did the least action. Moreover, the States that suffered the most casualties in the conflict were – for the most part – the first to engage in de facto or de jure Peace with Israel. And given the stability of the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli Peace agreements, and even the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement in the Golan Height, it is fair to say that the existential threat from the immediate circle of enemies was removed to a considerable degree.
“Third, at no time – including during the 1948 War of Independence – did the Arab world invest in the kind of human and material resources that would have been required to carry out a military or economic campaign capable of bringing about the destruction of Israel. Only a very small proportion of the population in the Arab States serves in the armed Forces. Only a relatively small proportion of the GDP in most Arab States goes to military expenditures. Moreover, most of the States in the region – even those that had suffered greatly from Israeli military actions and the Occupation of their territories – did not engage in developing WMDs that would allow them to destroy Israel. As we saw in Chapter 8, most programs aimed at developing WMDs and delivery systems in the Arab world emerged largely in response to Israel’s Nuclear Policy. In each and every War – including the 1948 War of Independence – Israel enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in terms of both quantitative and qualitative capabilities to the Arab Forces that actually confronted it. Israel was never the David in this conflict, and the Arab never played the role of Goliath.”
Ze’ev Maoz. Defending the holy land. A Critical analysis of Israel’s Security & Foreign Policy., Part 5. Causes and implications of the mismanagement of national Security and Foreign Policy. Chapter 12. Principal findings and lessons. University of Michigan Press. 2009.
Former academic director of the MA Program at the Israeli Defense Forces National Defense College and former head of the Graduate School of Government and Policy and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Academic journals published in
Security Studies
Journal of Politics
International Interactions
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of Peace Research
International Studies Review
International Security
Journal of Strategic Studies
International Studies Quarterly
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Conflict Management and Peace Science
International Political Science Review
Journal of Peace Research
Journal of Theoretical Politics
British Journal of Political Science
American Political Science Review
Political Psychology
Behavioral Science
World Politics
Electoral Studies
Public Choice
Theory and Decision
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations
State, Government, and International Relations
Review of International Studies
(Wikipedia)
"The central conclusion of the first part of this book is that most of Israel’s Wars were the result of deliberate aggressive designs or flawed conflict management strategies. At least one War (the Yom Kippur War) could have been avoided by judicious diplomacy. Israel’s War Experience is a story of folly, recklessness, and self-made traps. None of the Wars – with the possible exception of the 1948 War of Independence – was what Israelis call Milhemet Ein Brerah (“War of necessity”). They were all Wars of choice or Wars of folly."
------------------------
“Second, there is a huge gap between the hostility to Israel in Arab Rhetoric and the actual efforts invested in fighting it. In fact, for a long time there may well have been an inverse correlation between Rhetoric and effort in the Arab-Israeli conflict: those States and groups that made the most noise did the least action. Moreover, the States that suffered the most casualties in the conflict were – for the most part – the first to engage in de facto or de jure Peace with Israel. And given the stability of the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli Peace agreements, and even the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement in the Golan Height, it is fair to say that the existential threat from the immediate circle of enemies was removed to a considerable degree.
“Third, at no time – including during the 1948 War of Independence – did the Arab world invest in the kind of human and material resources that would have been required to carry out a military or economic campaign capable of bringing about the destruction of Israel. Only a very small proportion of the population in the Arab States serves in the armed Forces. Only a relatively small proportion of the GDP in most Arab States goes to military expenditures. Moreover, most of the States in the region – even those that had suffered greatly from Israeli military actions and the Occupation of their territories – did not engage in developing WMDs that would allow them to destroy Israel. As we saw in Chapter 8, most programs aimed at developing WMDs and delivery systems in the Arab world emerged largely in response to Israel’s Nuclear Policy. In each and every War – including the 1948 War of Independence – Israel enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in terms of both quantitative and qualitative capabilities to the Arab Forces that actually confronted it. Israel was never the David in this conflict, and the Arab never played the role of Goliath.”
Ze’ev Maoz. Defending the holy land. A Critical analysis of Israel’s Security & Foreign Policy., Part 5. Causes and implications of the mismanagement of national Security and Foreign Policy. Chapter 12. Principal findings and lessons. University of Michigan Press. 2009.
Former academic director of the MA Program at the Israeli Defense Forces National Defense College and former head of the Graduate School of Government and Policy and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Academic journals published in
Security Studies
Journal of Politics
International Interactions
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of Peace Research
International Studies Review
International Security
Journal of Strategic Studies
International Studies Quarterly
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Conflict Management and Peace Science
International Political Science Review
Journal of Peace Research
Journal of Theoretical Politics
British Journal of Political Science
American Political Science Review
Political Psychology
Behavioral Science
World Politics
Electoral Studies
Public Choice
Theory and Decision
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations
State, Government, and International Relations
Review of International Studies
(Wikipedia)
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