Jews Against Nationalism

"The notion that Israel’s Wars were Wars of self-defense and that its limited military actions were primarily “retaliatory” in nature rests on shaky foundations. Many Israeli politicians and institutional historians have tried to sell the world and the Israeli public for decades the conception that Israel’s military actions were primarily actions of self-defense. Some Israeli strategists have supported this notion by arguing that Israeli strategic posture was politically defensive (i.e., status quo oriented) but militarily offensive (e.g., Yaniv 1987a, 1995; Tal 2000; Levite 1989). The second part of this observation is generally true; the first part is not. "The central conclusion of the first part of this book is that most of Israel’s Wars were the result of deliberate aggressive designs or flawed conflict management strategies. At least one War (the Yom Kippur War) could have been avoided by judicious diplomacy. Israel’s War Experience is a story of folly, recklessness, an

“ Third, at no time – including during the 1948 War of Independence – did the Arab world invest in the kind of human and material resources that would have been required to carry out a military or economic campaign capable of bringing about the destruction of Israel. Only a very small proportion of the population in the Arab States serves in the armed Forces. Only a relatively small proportion of the GDP in most Arab States goes to military expenditures. Moreover, most of the States in the region – even those that had suffered greatly from Israeli military actions and the Occupation of their territories – did not engage in developing WMDs that would allow them to destroy Israel. As we saw in Chapter 8, most programs aimed at developing WMDs and delivery systems in the Arab world emerged largely in response to Israel’s Nuclear Policy. In each and every War – including the 1948 War of Independence – Israel enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in terms of both quantitative and qualitative

Civil War: "Facing off in 1947-8 were a highly motivated, literate, organized, semi-industrial society and a backward, largely illiterate, disorganized, agricultural one." Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 311. Benny Morris is one of Israel's most prominent historians. War Against the Arab States: "The Arab forces in Palestine consisted (until the end of May) of not more than 28,000 troops -- some 5,500 Egyptians, 6,000-9,000 Arab Legionnaires, 6,000 from Syria, 4,500 from Iraq, a handful of Lebanese, and the remainder Palestinian irregulars and foreign volunteers. On paper, according to Haganah estimates, the combined Arab armies had some 75 combat aircraft, 40 tanks, 500 armored vehicles, 140 field guns, and 220 antiaircraft and antitank guns. In practice they had far less, much of the equipment (especially the aircraft) being unserviceable, and some of the remainder never reaching Palestine. "After the invasion both sides substantially increased their force

An impressive military victory but not a miracle. "The armies were extremely ill-matched. Israelis, through their history, have tended to see themselves as the "weaker side," their army smaller and less well armed than their Arab enemies. The truth in 1967, as at other times, was different." Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 311. Benny Morris is one of Israel's most prominent historians "American intelligence accurately predicted that Israel would defeat any possible Arab coalition within a few days, perhaps a week...." p. 310 "The Arab armies were mostly professional forces, relatively poorly trained, and not properly mechanized. The Egyptian army suffered from a basic weakness owing to the politicization of its command echelons, which resulted in the appointment of incompetent and inexperienced senior commanders, and structural weaknesses that were to prove fatal in wartime." p. 312 "The Six-Day War was in all essentials, a clockwork

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_the_Gaza_Strip In September 2007, the Israeli cabinet voted to tighten the restrictions on the Gaza strip. The cabinet decision stated, "the movement of goods into the Gaza Strip will be restricted; the supply of gas and electricity will be reduced; and restrictions will be imposed on the movement of people from the Strip and to it."[49] In January 2010, the Israeli group Gisha took Israeli authorities to court, forcing them to reveal which goods were permitted and which goods weren't. The Israeli government replied that canned fruit, fruit juices and chocolate are blocked, while at the same time canned meat, canned tuna, mineral water, sesame paste, tea and coffee are allowed into the Gaza Strip.[50] Banned items also included coriander, shampoo and shoes.[49][51] In October 2010, papers were released which revealed a system to maintain the minimum level of basic goods entering the Strip. It contained upper and lower warning line

And of course it wasn't Hillary. DOES ISRAEL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF? HILLARY CLINTON vs BERNIE SANDERS RUMBLE IN NY!

Interview with I. Domb  author of The Transformation

Rabbi Amram Blau Amram Blau  (1894–1974) was a  Haredi   rabbi  from the  Hungarian  community of  Jerusalem . He was one of the founders of the fiercely  Anti-Zionist   Neturei Karta . Blau was born in Jerusalem, and grew up in the  Meah Shearim  neighbourhood. Like his brother Rabbi Moshe Blau who was a leader in the  Agudat Israel  movement, he was also active in the Aguda during the  British Mandate  era and was the editor of its newspaper,  Kol Israel  (Voice of Israel). [1]  But when the Aguda began to lean towards a modus vivendi with the  Zionist leaders , Blau claimed that the Aguda had sold out to the Zionist movement and in 1937 broke away and founded Neturei Karta. [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amram_Blau Neturei Karta was founded by Rabbi  Amram Blau  and Rabbi Aharon Katzenelbogen. Rabbi Blau was a native of  Meah Shearim  in Jerusalem and was active in the  Agudat Israel  during the  British Mandate  era. [7]  However, by the 1930s, the Aguda began to adopt a more co

Opposing idol worship can be a major portion of a Jew's daily job. This goes back all the way to Avraham. So if a major part of your day is found in opposing the avodah zara of your day, that's proper. Think of Rav Hirsch's day and how much of that was opposing the haskalah. Since half of Jewry now lives in Israel, zionism is one of the major challenges, if not the major challenge of the day. General turning away from faith is the problem of the era but zionism is one of the most potent ways it happens, problem the most potent as it is fueled by American governmental power.

Whenever I meet someone who is a physician but doesn't know that I know he's a physician, I do a little test to see how long it will take him to notify me of the essential information of what he does for a living. I know the professions of very few people as most don't tell you. Engineers often do as do lawyers. Physicians, it seems, always do. They find a way, usually within 10 minutes. Sometimes they are indirect. When I was in my residency -- that's a common one. Sometimes they'll drop the word patient or patients. Or they might say I'm on call. They find a way. I promised myself that one of these days I'd respond by saying, "Why do I need to know that you are a physician? Are you planning on taking a biopsy?" So the other day, I had my chance as I was talking privately with a person who happens to be a physician and there was no chance of embarrassing him in front of others. He responded very quickly, "I didn't say it. He did," re

"The notion that Israel’s Wars were Wars of self-defense and that its limited military actions were primarily “retaliatory” in nature rests on shaky foundations. Many Israeli politicians and institutional historians have tried to sell the world and the Israeli public for decades the conception that Israel’s military actions were primarily actions of self-defense. Some Israeli strategists have supported this notion by arguing that Israeli strategic posture was politically defensive (i.e., status quo oriented) but militarily offensive (e.g., Yaniv 1987a, 1995; Tal 2000; Levite 1989). The second part of this observation is generally true; the first part is not. "The central conclusion of the first part of this book is that most of Israel’s Wars were the result of deliberate aggressive designs or flawed conflict management strategies. At least one War (the Yom Kippur War) could have been avoided by judicious diplomacy. Israel’s War Experience is a story of folly, recklessness, an